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The Validity of the Common Law Marriage
in Ontario
GARY MURRAY KEYES
The recent decision in Alspector v. Alspector' throws into bold relief
a number of significant questions related to the nature of the Ontario
Marriage Act, and suggests the existence of a valid alternative method
of marrying. The primary purpose of this article is not to analyze
Alspector extensively but to demonstrate, by reviewing early English
and Canadian statutes, and relevant case law, that there is substantial
basis for the validity of the common law marriage in Ontario. After
examining the problem exemplified by Alspector, it is intended to
consider -the meaning of the term "common law marriage", especially
as it may apply in Ontario, the historical basis for its existence here,
the statutory enactments allegedly precluding the existence of the
common law marriage and, the nature and effect of the present Ontario
Marriage Act.2
The Problem-Nature and Source
When McRuer C.J.H.C., in Alspector, found a valid marriage to have
subsisted "notwithstanding the entire absence of a licence as required
by The Marriage Act", 3 his decision raised the question whether The
Marriage Act constitutes a set of administrative directives only, or
whether it is mandatory and invalidates any marriage not complying"
with its solemnization requisites. This question was not answered by
the Court of Appeal, when, on the basis of section 33 of the Ontario
Marriage Act,4 it affirmed the lower court decision.
It should be noted, however, that section 33 was only the second
of the reasons for judgment given in the lower court, and that the
Court of Appeal neither approved nor disapproved the first reason
which was based on a cardinal rule of statutory construction. The
Alspector case indicates some tendency by Ontario courts to uphold
the validity of a marriage when there is good faith, the intention to
comply with some law respecting marriage, and to cohabitate as man
• Mr. Keyes is in the second year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 [1957] O.R. 14, affirmed at p. 454.
2 R.S.O. 1950, c. 222.
3 [1957] O.R. 14, at p. 18.
1 RS.O. 1937, c. 207; now R.S.O. 1950, c. 222, s. 44.
NOTE: sec. 33 and sec. 44 are not quite the same; sec. 33 of the 1937 Act says
notwithstanding the entire absence of both 'banns and licence.
5 [1957] O.R. 14, at p. 21.
6 See for example, Clause v. Clause, [1956] O.W.N. 449.
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and wife.7 A further requirement seems to be that a marriage will be
upheld provided that the statute does not state in plain and unequivocal
language that failure to comply with the statute's provisions as to
solemnization will render the marriage null and void.
The decision in Clause v. Clause8 is apposite at this point. There
an impugned marriage was upheld in spite of lack of the parental con-
sent required by section 7 of the statute. Ferguson J. based his judgment
on the fact that section 7 did not state in clear and unequivocal
language that non-compliance with its requirements rendered the
marriage a nullity. If the' foregoing cases support the propo-
sition that the Marriage Act in its present form constitutes a set of
administrative directives which do not effect nullification for non-
compliance, one may well wonder in what circumstances the courts
will uphold a marriage which is irregular in form. It will be the burden
of this article to establish that such an irregular marriage should be
held valid when it amounts to a marriage at common law. Moreover,
the writer will endeavour to demonstrate that the common law form
of marriage is a valid alternative mode of marrying, even though it is
not expressly recognized by The Marriage Act.
The Meaning of the Term "Common Law Marriage"
At the outset, it should be observed that a marriage irregular in
form,-a common law marriage, does not refer to a woman, living with
a man as a "common law wife" in the colloquial sense of a clandestine
relationship. According to some legal writers,9 no particular ceremony
is required by the common law for the valid celebration of a marriage.
Prior to 1753, the common law form of marriage was valid,
... though it departed from the rubric in respect of being celebrated in a
private house instead of a church; with no witnesses but the clergyman,
instead of in the face of the congregation; 'with no person to give the bride
away; without banns or a licence; without the use of a ring; without the
repetition of the whole service; provided that the parties took one another
by words in the present tense.10
If the contract of marriage be made per verba de praesenti (in
words of the present tense), and is not followed by cohabitation, or if
made per verba de futuro (in words of the future tense and suggesting
conditions) and is followed by consummation, or if the promise is
subsequente copula (after consummation) various writers have put
forth the view that it amounts to a valid marriage. Such a marriage
7 If the parties to a marriage solemnized in good faith and intended to be
in compliance with this Act are not under a legal disqualification to contract
such a marriage and after such solemnization have lived together and cohabited
as man and wife, such marriage shall be deemed a valid marriage, notwith-
standing that the person who solemnized the marriage was not authorized to
solemnize marriage, and notwithstanding the absence of or any irregularity
or insufficiency in the publication of banns or the issue of licence or special
permit: R.S.O. 1950, c. 222, s. 44.
8 [1956] O.W.N. 449.
9 J. p. Bishop, Marriage and Divorce (Chicago, Flood & Co., 1891), p. 327.
10 Beamish v. Beamish (1861), 9 H. of L. [Cases 274, at p. 324.
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was considered by the common law to be as binding as if made in the face
of the congregation of a church. However, as Lord Campbell pointed
out in Regina v. Millis", the use of the expression "contract of marriage"
is equivocal and a bethrothment was not to be regarded as matrimony.
As a result, the distinction seems to have existed between marriages
contracted per verba de praesenti, when the parties used words of the
present tense, and contracts per verba de futuro, which were in effect
conditional and no more, in Lord Campbell's opinion, than betrothments.
The marriage per verba de praesenti gave rise to considerable
difficulties of proof if the witnesses were no longer living or if there
were no witnesses except the parties and they disagreed. A frequent
answer to a petition for a divorce a mensa et thoro was the allegation
that there was no valid marriage or that one of the parties was pre-
viously married. Thus if no witnesses were available and the parties
chose not to raise the matter, subsequent marriages, even in facie
ecclesiae would stand unimpugned. It was to remedy the confusion
caused by these "clandestinle' marriages that Lord Hardwicke's Act was
introduced in 1753. While the praotical effect of an irregular marriage
was almost certainly as above stated, it was said in 1703 that "though
the positive law ordains that marriage shall be by the priest, yet that
omission makes such a marriage . . . irregular only, but not void". 12
However, there are some who consider such a common law marriage
before 1753 actually invalid to all intents and purposes following the
decision in Regina v. Millis.13
Regina v. Millis was a case to which the Marriage Act of 1753 did
not apply. The appellant Millis, having contracted two marriages, and
being indicted for bigamy, raised the question whether the first marriage
was legal and complete, not having been celebrated according to the laws
of the Church of England to which the appellant belonged. It was held
that the presence of an episcopally ordained priest was essential to the
validity of a common law marriage whether celebrated in Ireland or
elsewhere. The judgment of the court below being against the validity
of the first marriage, and the law Lords being equally divided, the rule
semper praesumptur pro negante applied, and the judgment of the lower
court was affirmed.
Pollock and Maitland, however, doubt the historical soundness of
Regina v. Millis for the following reasons: First, it was the Council
of Trent (1563) which required that the expression of consent to take
each other as man and wife be made by the parties in the presence of
the parish priest and at least two witnesses. Prior to the Council of Trent,
though the Church insisted that the contracting act be made in facie
ecelesiae, a clandestine marriage, even though forbidden, was nonethe-
less valid.' 4. Secondly, because the Canons of the Council of Trent
11 (1844), Cl. & Fin. 534.
12 Haydon v. Gould (1703), Salk. 119, at p. 120.
13 [1844), Cl. & Fin. 534.
:4 Sir F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, History of English Law, 2nd ed.
(Cambridge, University Press, 1899), 11, pp. 369-372.
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were never promulgated in England, the old canon law of marriage
presumably would have continued in England as civil law until marriages
per verba de praesenti were terminated by the Marriage Act of 1753.
In effect, Pollock and Maitland consider the reasons given by the House
of Lords in Millis to restrict the solemnization of a valid common law
marriage to an episcopally ordained priest, to be of doubtful historical
validity. It is submitted that even if the rule in Regina v. Millis actually
existed in England prior to 1753, it was never applied in the territory
which later became Upper Canada especially in the light of the recent
decision of Wolfenden v. Wolfenden.15 This case followed two earlier
decisions and held that a common law marriage could be validly con-
tracted, under certain circumstances, outside England, despite the
absence of an episcopally ordained priest. It -also held that Regina v.
Millis, insofar as it was authoritative, was confined to England and
Ireland, and that colonists were assumed to take so much of the law
of England with them to their new homes as was applicable to their
new situations and conditions. This decision covers cases where colonies
have been settled in the absence of other peoples and those that have
been secured by conquest of the natives or other claimants.
The Historical Basis for the Introduction of the Common Law
Marriage into Ontario
The reasons for judgment of Lord Merriman in Wolfenden v.
Wolfenden are of particular significance. It is there inferred that the
English law of common law marriage, without the presence of an epis-
copally ordained priest, was first introduced into the territory which
is now called Ontario prior to 1791, when, according to some, Lord
Hardwicke's Act of 1753 precluding common law marriages in England,
became law in the Province of Upper Canada. In Wolfenden, the question
concerned the validity of a common law marriage between two mission-
aries in China where there was no prior notice of the intended marriage,
no licence procured, no banns published, and the minister was not a
person authorized to perform a marriage under the Foreign Marriage
Act, 1892. In finding a valid common law marriage, Lord Merriman
reasons that though English law was administered in the district, the
whole of English law did not necessarily apply; he adopted the principle
laid down in Maclean v. Cristall:
Although colonists take the law of England 'With them to their new home,
they only take so much of it as is applicable to their situation and condition.
In many cases no question will arise as to the inapplicability of several pro-
visions of English law, which are clearly seen to be merely municipal....
Blackstone lays down the rule very authoritatively on this subject: What
shall be admitted and what rejected, at what times, and under what
restrictions, must, in case of dispute, be decided in the first instance by the
colonists' own provincial judicature, subject to revision of the King in
Council.'6
As a result, it was held that in such a territory there is, so far -as the
'r [1946] P. 61.
16 (1849) 7 Notes of Cases Supplement 17, 24.
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requirements of English law are concerned in relation to a common law
marriage, no obligation that the ceremony should be performed in the
presence of an episcopally ordained priest.
For similar reasons, it is submitted that colonists who, after 1759,
settled in what later was named Upper Canada, brought with them
only so much of the law of England as was applicable to their new
situations and conditions. Indeed, there is a striking similarity between
conditions in early Upper Canada, and those considered in Wolfenden.
Historically, therefore, it is possible to say that if any law on common
law marriages was transported to Upper Canada, it would exclude the
requirement that the ceremony be performed in the presence of an epis-
copally ordained priest. In addition, the territory was one to which
adherents of many faiths gravitated from Europe and, after 1776, from
the United States. These colonists looked to the Imperial Government
to protect their interests. Surely it would have been unsound policy to
render marriages of colonists invalid on the ground that English law
prior to 1753 required -the presence of an episcopally ordained priest
to constitute a valid common law marriage. That such a policy was
adopted is improbable in the light of the religious policy of the colonial
authorities which, in statutes increasingly recognized the former dis-
senting sects, and which culminated in the dislodging of the Church
of England as the Established Church and Religion. 7
Hence on the basis of Wolfenden v. Wolfenden, there are sound
historical grounds to support the introduction into Ontario of the
English law related to the common law marriage. Further, it is sub-
mitted that such a common law marriage, that is, one which is irregular
due to its non-compliance with some formal ceremonial requirement,
was never invalidated because the marriage was not solemnized by an
episcopally ordained priest, and that such a requirement was never
part of the common law brought by the early colonists to "Ontario".
A Review of Statutes Held to Vitiate the Common Law Marriage
The foregoing, then, was the state of the Common Law when on
December 26, 1791, the Province of Upper Canada began its separate
provincial existence. It is, however, necessary to examine the various
Marriage Acts after 1791, because in O'Connor v. Kennedy, 8 Armour
C.J.0. held that The Ontario Marriage Act of 187419 implied the existence
of Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act of 1753. If sound, this conclusion
vitiates the validity of the common law marriage in Ontario because
the Act of 175320 had been passed by the British Parliament expressly
to invalidate such clandestine marriages as the common law marriage
had become by that time. If the Ontario Act of 1874 pre-supposes the
existence of Lord Hardwicke's Act, then it follows that the present
17Edgar McInnis, Canada: A Political and Social History (Toronto, Rinehart
& Co., 1954), p. 199.
18 (1888), 15 O.R. 20, at p. 22.
19 37 Vict. c. 6.
20 26 Geo. II, c. 33.
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Ontario Marriage Act, which is similar in form to the Act of 1874,
similarly presumes the existence of the Act of 1753 with its nullity
provision for non-compliance.
In O'Connor v. Kennedy, the Chief Justice traced the introduction
of Lord Hardwicke's Act of 1753 to the statute enacted by the first
Parliament of Upper Canada enacted. in 1791, which provided that
the laws of England should apply in matters of property and civil
rights. At the outset, it should be observed that Lord Hardwicke's Act
specifically precludes the application of its provisions "to any marriages
solemnized beyond the Seas". 21 Yet, Armour -C.J.O. refers to provisions
of that Act as if they had been introduced in toto as the law of Upper
Canada in 1791 and seems to ignore the aforementioned restriction
in its application. On this ground alone, therefore, the learned Chief
Justice's reliance on the existence of Lord Hardwicke's Act in Ontario
law is open to question.
The Chief Justice then enumerates the various Upper Canada and
Ontario Statutes relating to marriage and solemnization. The first
Marriage Act was enacted in 1793.22. This validated marriages there-
tofore irregularly solemnized before a magistrate, commander of a
post, adjutant or surgeon or any other person in any public office or
employment. It also provided for solemnization by Justices of the Peace
until such time as there should be five parsons or ministers of the Church
of England in the district; and prohibited Justices of the Peace from
performing the ceremony after such parsons became incumbents in the
district. The next two Acts (1798 and 1830)23 enabled ministers or
clergymen of other sects to solemnize marriages. Then the 1874 Act
is discussed as to the publication of banns, and the Chief Justice
concludes that notwithstanding -the lack of any express provision nulli-
fying a marriage for non-publication of banns, the marriage in question
would still be void because Lord Hardwicke's Act of 1753 was by
implication of the foregoing statutes still in force.
His reasons are that this early legislation impliedly recognized the
force of the English Marriage Act of 1753 in Ontario by from time to
time passing laws modifying and qualifying its provisions. Since there
was no express enactment in Ontario rendering void a marriage solemn-
ized without full compliance with the Marriage Act of his day, and
that since the Ontario Legislature had never deemed it necessary to
make any such provision, the Chief Justice reasoned that there was cogent
evidence that it did not do so because the provisions of Lord Hard-
wicke's Act of 1753 had always been treated as in force in Ontario
if not before 1791, at least from that date forward.
The Chief Justice declared that the provisions of the Act of
1753 preventing clandestine marriages were introduced into this pro-
vince so far as they were suitable to the circumstances and were not
21 Ibid., sec. 18.
2233 Geo. III, c. 5 (U.C.).
23 38 Geo. III, c. 4 (U.C.); 2 Geo. IV, c. 36 (U.C.)
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inconsistent with the civil institutions.24 But the rough and un-
unsettled circumstances of early Upper Canada were in sharp
contrast to the civilized but somewhat decadent and immoral times
that existed at the time of the passing of Lord Hardwicke's Act (1753).
Indeed, the implied object of that Act was to prevent the reprehensible
clandestinity exemplified by the "Fleet Marriages" solemnized so
hurriedly by the "Fleet Parsons". The various Marriage Acts of early
Upper Canada, on the other hand, were concerned to encourage a
respect for the sanctity of marriage as an institution by recognizing the
difficulties of solen~ization due to lack of clergy and the influx of
many new sects hitherto unrecognized by the state as having authority
to perform marriages. 25
This does not mean that the Legislature did not intend to adopt
the regulations on solemnization set out in the Act of 1753; however,
it does not necessarily follow, as Armour C.J.O. suggests, that because
subsequent Marriage Acts adopt many of the regulatory provisions of
Lord Hardwicke's Act of 1753, those Acts ipso facto adopt the same
nullity provisos merely because they have no such provisos in them.
Such reasoning is untenable not only because it does not take
proper cognizance of the intention and purpose of the Legislature in
the circumstances, but because it completely neglects one of the classic
canons of construction of statutory provisions.
Enactments prescribing formalities which are to be observed in
solemnizing a marriage are not absolute, although expressed in negative
and prohibitory language and, if there is no declaration of nullity,
neglect of these formalities does not invalidate the marriage.20 Thus, in
Catteral v. Sweetman27 the interpretation of a Colonial Act's provision
as to a signed declaration in writing prior to a marriage was questioned.
Dr. Lushington declared:
There never appears to have been a decision where words in a statute
relating to marriage, though prohibitory and negative, have been held toinfer a nullity, unless such nullity was declared in the Act. In viewing
successive Marriage Acts, it appears that prohibitory words, without adeclaration of nullity, were not considered by the Legislature to create a
nullity.28
On this ground, Dr. Lushington held the marriage in question to be
valid, although irregular in form.
With respect to the Marriage Act of 1874, it is submitted that the
reasoning of Armour C.J.O. in O'Connor v. Kennedy is suspect when he
suggests that the then current Marriage Act vitiates a marriage for
neglect of some formality of solemnization because its prohibitory and
negative language infers nullity based on the implied existence of the
24 O'Connor v. Kennedy (1888), 15 O.R. 20 at pp. 23-24.
25 See: 33 Geo. III, c. 5 (UJC.); 38 Geo. III, c. 4 (U.C.).
26 Craies on, Statute Law, 5th ed. (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1952), p. 312
and cases there cited.
27 (1845), 9 Jur. 951.
28 Ibid., at p. 954.
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nullity provisions of the Act of 1753. His disregard for the accepted
canon of construction in, Catteral v. Sweetman, and his misreading of
history in regard to the intention of prior Marriage Acts, lends support
to the submission that Lord Hardwicke's Act allegedly vitiating the
common law marriage in Ontario cannot exist simply by implication of
the subsequent Ontario Marriage Acts. Indeed such statutes might be
taken to have repealed by implication any possible existence of the
Act of 1753.2 9 In addition, it is submitted that, since the 1874 Marriage
Act resembles our present Statute and contains none of the nullity
provisos of Lord Hardwicke's Act, the Marriage Act R.S.O. 1950 does
not necessarily imply the existence of the Act of 1753 either. If the
foregoing reasoning is valid, there does not seem to be any real statutory
basis for denying the existence of an alternative means of marrying,
namely, the common law marriage. However, it remains to see if there
is any impediment to the existence of the common law marriage by
virtue of the nature and effect of the present Marriage Act.
The Nature and Effect of The Marriage Act R.S.O. 1950
The true nature of The Marriage Act might be best indicated by
an inspection of the cases concerning solemnization. In the past, there
has been some dispute as to the constitutional competence of the pro-
vincial government to impose nullity provisions for failure to comply
with the statutory provisions. The only legislative provision since
Confederation that purported to declare marriages void for failure to
comply with the requirements of the Marriage Act followed the decision
in Peppiatt v. Peppiatt30. This case principally turned on the constitu-
tional validity of those provisions of the Marriage Act which dealt
with the consent to the marriage of a person under 18 years of age.
After this decision, the Act was amended 3' to provide that parental
consent was to be deemed an absolutely essential condition precedent to
the solemnization of a valid marriage with the penalty of nullity for
non-compliance. In 1932 the nullity proviso was struck out,32 and no
similar words have since been inserted. In Peppiatt v. Peppiatt, more-
over, Meredith C.J.O. followed the long line of authorities which
scrutinize meticulously the provisions of any statute which purports
to render a marriage void where cohabitation has followed. They declare
that it is incumbent on the Legislature to say in plain and unequivocal
language whether conditions subsequent to and including ceremonial
requirements are absolutely necessary to a valid marriage.
Yet it now seems established that a Provincial Legislature can
enact conditions on solemnization of marriages in the Province which
may affect the validity of the contract. In Kerr v. Kerr,33 Duff C.J.
put it this way:
29 See footnote 25 ante.
30 (1916), 36 O.L-.R. 427.
31The Marriage Law Amendment Act, 1919 (Ont.), c. 35, s. 2.
32 The Statute Law Amendment Act, 1932 (Ont.), c. 53, s. 17.
33 [1934] S.C.R. 72.
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The authority of the provinces, therefore, extends not only to prescribing
such formalities as properly fall within the matters designated by "Solemniza-
tion of Marriage": they have the power to enforce the rules laid down by
penalty, by -attacking the consequence of invalidity, and by attaching such
consequences absolutely or conditionally.34
Such power, it should again be noted, has not been exercised in
express terms since 1932. This suggests that the grave consequences
of affecting the status of marriage is perhaps the underlying reason
why the courts approach the matter as does Meredith C.J.O. in the
eaarlier case of Peppiatt v. Peppictt referred to above.
In Alspector,35 McRuer C.J.H.C. also seems to approve the canon
of construction that the legislature must state in plain and unequivocal
language that failure to comply with the requirements as to solemniza-
tion will result in nullity. Indeed, he adopts in part the reasoning in Rex
v. Birmingham0 That case held that the intention of Parliament in
regard to certain penalty clauses in the English Marriage Act was not
to be interpreted as rendering a marriage void because the minister
was not duly authorized, but merely to prevent fraudulent and clan-
destine marriages, by depriving the guilty party of any pecuniary
benefit. In Alspector the Chief Justice decided that a marriage was valid
where the cantor was subject to a penalty for performing the marriage
without a licence. He also refers with approval to the decision of
Ferguson J. in Clause v. Ciause,37 who arrived at a similar conclusion
where the validity of the marriage was attacked for lack of the consent
required by the Act.
In the Aspector case, Roach J.A. bases his decision on the second
of McRuer C.J.H.C.'s reasons for judgment, namely section 33, but he
qualifies it by declaring that the requirement of the section that the
parties must intend to comply with this Act really means that they
must intend to comply with some law, it not being the intention of the
Legislature that every couple marrying in Ontario would be fully
conversant with "this" Act. In addition, he finds that the Legislature
has sought to enforce compliance with the solemnization requirements
by imposing a penalty on, the official who solemnizes a marriage contrary
to section 33. In his opinion, the Legislature has enacted the consequence
of invalidity in this case conditionally so that section 4 (licence) and
section 33 must be read together. On the facts, Roach J.A. decided
that the marriage was valid notwithstanding the lack of a licence,
because the parties complied with section 33, and that there was suffi-
cient evidence of good faith, intention to adhere to the law, and
cohabitation so as to comply with the law of the Province.
There seems, however, to be conflicting dicta in Alspector: In the
High Court, McRuer C.J.HC. appears to regard the statute as a set
of administrative directives which need the teeth of clear and unequi-
34 Ibid., at p. 75.
"5 [1957] O.R. 14.
368 B. & C. 29.
37 [1956] O.W.N. 449.
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vocal language in every pertinent clause in order to render a marriage
null and void for non-compliance with the Act; in the Court of Appeal,
Roach J.A. expressly held that there is a conditional invalidity, basing
his reasons for judgment on dicta of Duff C.J. in Kerr v. Kerr. His
reasons are that the issuance of a licence or special permit and the
publication of banns as pre-ceremonial requirements, are formalities
falling within the matters designated by "Solemnization of Marriage"
in, Kerr v. Kerr. The legislature has sought to enforce compliance with
those requirements by the imposition of a penalty on the official who
solemnizes a marriage without one of these three alternative require-
ments having been complied with. He concludes that the legislature
has also enacted the consequence of invalidity conditionally for non-
compliance with these solemnization requirements-that is, that section
4 (licence requirement) and section 33 must be read together to ascer-
tain the legislature's intention. At first glance, then, this latter judg-
ment might seem to support the contention that the Marriage Act is
more than a mere set of administrative directives, so that it can be
viewed as mandatory in nature, imposing invalidity on a marriage that
is irregular in form, and does not meet the required state of mind set
out in section 33 of the Marriage Act. But it must be noted that Kerr
v. Kerr, on which Roach J.A. relies so heavily, also approves the dicta
in Rex v. Birmingham which held that in construing penalty
clauses in the English Marriage Act, such sections should not be inter-
preted as rendering a marriage void.38 It is therefore suggested that this
conditional invalidity interpretation of The Marriage Act is questionable
on its authority, and is not, alone, a firm basis for considering the
Statute mandatory in nature and effect.
Conclusion
It is submitted that there is a tendency on the part of Ontario
courts to treat the provisions of the Ontario Marriage Act as directory,
and a marked reluctance to find invalidity without express provisos of
nullity for non-observance of the Act.39 InA essence, section 44 of the
present Act seems to substantiate what are historically understood to
be the requirements of a common law marriage, namely, good faith and
intention on the part of the parties to comply with some law related
to marriage solemnization, followed by cohabitation as man and wife.
If these are present, a marriage, though irregular in form because
of the absence of witnesses, or lack of licence, banns, etc., would never-
theless have been considered a valid marriage at common law. Hence
it is suggested that a marriage considered valid under section 44, is no
different from the common law marriage defined in the second section
of this article.
Moreover, an important problem is raised as to the nature of the
Marriage Act in conjunction with section 44 by such an interpretation
38 See footnote 30 ante.
39 For the policy of the English courts, see for example: Taczanowska v.
Taczanowski [1957] 3 All E.R. 563; Kochanski v. Kochanski [1957] 3 All E.R. 142.
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of the section: that is,'if the statute is directory in nature, as suggested
above, the common law marriage, as an alternate means of marrying
may exist entirely outside the Act. Given good faith and intention by
the parties to comply with some law related to solemnization, it is
submitted that a marriage irregular in form still may be valid, not-
withstanding the lack, for some bona fide reason, of cohabitation as
required by section 44. This proposition, however, evokes the vital
question as to the nature and purpose of section 44.
If the Statute in toto is directory rather than mandatory, why was
section 44 enacted? To put the question another way: if the Act is
a set of administrative directives, non-compliance with any specific
section would work no more adverse result on the validity of the
questioned marriage than would lack of adherence to any of the three
elements of section 44. In this instance, section 44 appears superfluous.
One possible explanation for the enactment of the section, even if the
whole Act is directory, is that it might have been intended to exemplify
a cardinal principle of domestic law:
The marriage state being one of -the chief foundations of society, it follows
naturally that the law tends to favour the presumption of validity for any
questioned marriage.40
Therefore it might be said that section 44 embodies the essentials of
the common law marriage,41 and implies its existence in Ontario. Yet
this is but a possible explanation of the purpose of the section; it does
not satisfactorily explain its effect.
There is no clear-cut decision on the effect of section 44. The
decision in Alspector, based on conditional invalidity, might be said
to be inapplicable because section 33 of the 1937 Marriage Act governed
in that case and differs slightly from section 44 of the 1950 Statute.42
Such -a state of the law, makes one wonder when the courts will refrain
from applying the accepted presumptions in favour of the validity of
marriage. Will our courts uphold a marriage which lacks one or more
of the essential requirements of section 44? Or is there a conditional
invalidity? In view of these questions, it is suggested that the line
between a valid and invalid marriage is too wide and has too often
resulted in the impugning of a marriage solely to frustrate the intended
devolution of an estate.43 Therefore it is submitted that there is a need
for legislative amendment or a clear decision by The Supreme Court of
Canada as to the nature of the Marriage Act, especially the effect of
section 44.
.40 Eversley on Domestic Relations, 6th ed. (London, Sweet & Maxwell,
1951), p. 4.
41See footnote 7 ante.
4 2 See footnotes 4 and 7 ante.
43 See for example, Alspector v. Alspector [1957] O.R. 14.
(VOL. I
